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Abstract
The SITDRM Enterprise system [1] protects private customer data by allowing customers to provide policies
in the form of a machine-readable license. When employees of an organization want to use customers’ data,
they must be forced to abide by the licences provided. Some sort of hardened terminal must be used to
ensure that not only the hardware and software will cooperate, but that the user of the terminal will too.
We use the Trusted Computing Group’s speciﬁcations for a trusted platform upon which to build a data
user terminal that can be proved to implement correct license-enforcing behavior. A Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) and a TPM-using operating system are all that may be required to construct a veriﬁably
secure terminal.
Keywords: Trusted platform module. Digital rights management.
1 Introduction
Digital rights management (DRM) technology allows the use and dissemination of
electronic information to be controlled by a machine-readable license that describes
who may perform what action on the protected information, and under what con-
ditions the action may be performed. DRM is well-known for its application to
protecting copyrighted material, but can also be used to protect private personal
information and sensitive corporate documents.
In order to restrict access to information according to licenses, DRM requires
the existence of tamper-resistant terminals trusted to comply with any conditions
imposed by licenses. Without the existence of such terminals, it is possible for
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an attacker to obtain access to information by constructing a phony terminal that
simply ignores any conditions imposed by a license.
Software alone is not enough to verify that the users and terminal follow the
rules set forth by the license. It is relatively easy for a technically-adept attacker to
modify a software terminal in order to disable its licence-checking functions, or to
extract sensitive information from it.
In this paper, we describe our experiences in adding support for hardware spec-
iﬁed by the Trusted Computing Group [2] to a privacy protection system known as
SITDRM Enterprise [1], which protects private customer data according to licenses
supplied by customers.
We discuss how SITDRM and Trusted Computing (TC) ﬁt together, and how
one can use TC to implement such a terminal. We describe a prototype implemen-
tation of a secure terminal as well as diﬃculties encountered in development of the
software. Finally, we describe how the prototype terminal was incorporated into
the full SITDRM Enterprise system.
2 Related Work
Several TC platforms have appeared over the past decade, including Microsoft’s
dormant Next-Generation Secure Computing Base [6], the “Terra” trusted virtual
machine developed by Garﬁnkel, et al. [5] and the “Enforcer” Linux Security Module
developed by Marchesini, et al [4].
Marchesini, et al., in particular, describe a platform based on the Trusted Com-
puting Group’s speciﬁcation, and discuss how their platform can be used to attest
to the integrity of an oﬀ-the-shelf multimedia player, similar to the eﬀect that we
wished to achieve in our project. The player used in their demonstration, however,
does not support DRM and they do not appear to have explored the development
of a complete DRM system based on their platform.
3 SITDRM Enterprise
“SITDRM” (for “Smart Internet Technology DRM”) is a DRM testbed developed at
the Co-operative Research Centre for Smart Internet Technology in Australia. The
system is based on the MPEG-21 Intellectual Property Management and Protection
Components (ISO/IEC 21000-4:2006).
SITDRM forms the basis for a suite of applications known as “SITDRM Enter-
prise” that provide a privacy and document protection system for enterprises [1].
SITDRM Enterprise allows individuals to control the way in which their information
is distributed and used by expressing their privacy preferences in a way enabling
automatic enforcement by data users’ computers.
SITDRM Enterprise applies the DRM model to information submitted via web
forms, as shown in Figure 1. Data is created by a data subject (e.g. customer), and
submitted in a protected form to a data controller (e.g. service provider). In order
to access the protected data, a data user (e.g. employee) must obtain a license from
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Fig. 1. Applying digital rights management to private data.
a license issuer. In this system, individual data subjects act as license issuers for
their own data, and licenses grant the right to read data for the purpose that the
data was uploaded.
The fundamental requirement for the system to be secure is that there exist
tamper-resistant terminals trusted to uphold the conditions imposed by licenses,
and whose compliance can be established by license issuers prior to any licenses
being issued to them.
The design of such terminals and their integration into SITDRM Enterprise is
the focus of the present paper. We present three goals as criteria for measuring the
security of a data user terminal.
Goal 1: Prevent Key Exposure. Keys stored in memory should not be leaked
to processes not complying with SITDRM licenses. When stored in main mem-
ory (unencrypted), keys can be leaked to third-party processes in many ways [7].
When the client software runs under a kernel that cannot be trusted to isolate
one process’ memory space from other processes (or does not securely deallocate
memory), any keys stored in memory may be read by malicious third-party pro-
cesses running on the same host. Leakage of these keys would allow a third-party
process to masquerade as a legitimate SITDRM process.
Goal 2: Prevent Data Exposure. Data should not be leaked to processes not
complying with SITDRM licenses. When being read or otherwise utilized, sensi-
tive data must be kept unencrypted in memory. This memory must be managed
in a secure manner similar to that for keys.
Additionally, data should not be transmitted to devices that may behave con-
trary to a corresponding license. If the behavior of an attached device cannot be
veriﬁed, then the device could record unencrypted data and later use the data in
violation of a license.
Goal 3: Verify Terminal Integrity. License issuers should have a way to deter-
mine that a terminal will enforce SITDRM licenses before sending it any licenses
or encrypted digital items. Terminal integrity includes veriﬁcation of the hard-
ware and software composing the terminal—a valid conﬁguration should somehow
be proven to the data controller allowing the terminals to be maintained by some-
one other than the license issuer. As long as run-time veriﬁcation can take place,
the terminals can be purchased, installed and used without authorization of the
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private data’s subjects, or the manager of the license database.
If these goals are satisﬁed, every terminal T can be associated with a secret key
SKT and corresponding public key PKT , such that the validity of PKT can be
attested to by the TPM that hosts the terminal. The secret key is known only by
TPM and usable only by the terminal; in particular, it is not known to or usable
by the human user of the terminal.
An item of data X can be protected by encrypting it with a unique content key
Ck. Any license that grants a right to perform an action on that item contains Ck
encrypted by the public key PKT of the terminal on which that license is to be
used. If license issuers only issue licenses to terminals that they have veriﬁed to be
genuine as above, the content encryption key and therefore the data is accessible
only to trusted terminals.
SITDRM assumes that every data user U is identiﬁed by a public key PKU . In
the implementation described in this paper, the corresponding private key SKU is
protected by the TPM as for terminal keys, but it is not used for any cryptographic
purpose in licenses or protected data. In this way, the security of the system depends
on the trustworthiness of terminals rather than the trustworthiness of the users,
while users may still take advantage of the TPM’s security features to protect their
private keys.
4 Trusted Computing
“Trusted Computing” (TC) is used to describe a computing environment that can be
trusted to behave appropriately — for example, the computer will not run malicious
software. In the case of SITDRM, the system designers would trust a TC computer
to correctly enforce any licenses issued.
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is a group developed in order to provide
unbiased standards for TC. They have developed many speciﬁcations and standards
for the Trusted Computing Platform, including functionality requirements and an
API speciﬁcation for software stacks to be implemented by hardware manufacturers
[2].
The TC platform is composed of many pieces. Trusted Building Blocks are items
that must be reasonably trusted on faith before the whole system can be trusted;
they include elements such as a few CPU instructions used to initialize the system
and RAM. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a chip on the computer’s main
board and acts as the core engine of the TC system and it performs cryptographic
operations, manages trusted data storage, and veriﬁes the operation of various sys-
tem pieces. With these elements and a TC certiﬁcate authority, a TC platform can
be implemented providing the following features.
4.1 Measurement and Attestation.
A trusted computer needs to have the ability to prove that it should be trusted. This
is done by “measuring” its current and previous operational states — including the
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hardware and operating system — in a way that cannot be falsiﬁed. This involves
extending a cryptographic hash chain and logging what was measured. If the boot
process of a computer can be trusted (is measured as expected), then the currently
running operating system can be trusted to behave correctly.
A TC measurement is simply a digest of some values. For example, a SHA-1
digest of a binary, embedded code, or hardware register values may be produced as
a measurement for a computer’s component or program. These measurements are
stored in Platform Conﬁguration Registers (PCRs). The order in which they are
measured is enforced by extending the PCR by replacing the PCR’s current value
with valt ← SHA1(valt−1|X), where X is the new measurement and “|” denotes
concatenation.
Fig. 2. How the TPM measures the boot process
When the computer boots, a chain of trust is formed by taking measurements
of each part of the system as it starts, then extending a hash with the measured
values (Figure 2). This trusted boot process is discussed in [2]. Applications can
be measured by the OS before they are launched and the measured value is used
to extend a PCR. Each measurement is also stored in a Stored Measurement Log
(SML) which is used later during attestation for integrity veriﬁcation.
When a third party wishes to verify the integrity of a terminal, it asks the
terminal to attest to its integrity. In TC, this is sometimes referred to as attestation.
On request, the terminal sends the PCR and SML data to the challenger. The
challenger uses the information recorded in the SML to recreate the PCR values. If
the PCR values can be successfully recreated by the challenger, then the conﬁgura-
tion of the terminal has been proven.
The challenger then analyzes the contents of the SML to decide whether or not
the conﬁguration is acceptable. To do this, the challenger must retrieve credentials
issued by a trusted authority or the manufacturer of the software. These credentials
contain information about the software (such as the digest and version), signed by
a trusted authority, that are supposed to be used in the SML of a system using the
subject of the credential.
4.2 Protected Cryptographic Operations.
The TPM also contains some protected cryptographic abilities. These are functions
carried out in a trusted area of the computer, secluded from possible intrusion from
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an untrusted OS or other malicious third-party software.
Key Generation and Storage. The TPM can be used for RSA key generation,
protected storage, and encryption/decryption or signing/verifying operations.
Key pairs can be generated by the TPM and then stored encrypted by the TPM’s
storage root key (SRK). The SRK is stored on the TPM itself in nonvolatile mem-
ory, and the private (decrypting) SRK cannot be copied from the chip. In this
way, any key encrypted by the TPM can only be decrypted by the same TPM
with the same SRK, and keys generated by the TPM and may be safely stored
on the hard drive since the TPM is needed to “unlock” them.
Signing and Binding. Additionally, the TPM supports encryption (binding) and
decryption (unbinding) as well as signing and veriﬁcation using the RSA keys it
generates. Keys can be generated an used on the TPM and without ever copying
them in main memory; this avoids the risk of involuntary memory disclosure
vulnerabilities. (For examples of these vulnerabilities see [7].)
5 A TC Secure Terminal
Our aim in using a TPM chip to harden a SITDRM data user terminal is to control
as tightly as possible the existence and movement of secret keys and unencrypted
data. Ideally, we would like to be able to use the TPM as a trusted input/output
channel between the SITDRM software and output devices. Unfortunately this is
unrealistic, since the TPM is not designed to be used as a cryptographic processor.
We consider a situation where a custom SITDRM data user terminal is run on a
trusted platform.
5.1 Ideal Secure Terminal
An ideal secure terminal would ensure that the data and keys encrypting the data
are only used correctly and by the correct terminal users. Such a terminal would be
considered “trusted” in the fashion that a TC device is trusted. This simply means
that the computer, its attached devices, and its user will all be restricted to usage
allowed by SITDRM licenses.
• Platform Security. The operating system and hardware comprising the ter-
minal’s platform would be trusted if the SITDRM software could run on the
terminal with complete memory protection. Additionally, the kernel would need
to relinquish all memory ownership rights to the SITDRM process while it was
running, giving the SITDRM software exclusive control over its memory to hide
keys and data from third-party programs. A terminal is deemed platform se-
cure if the operating system and hardware behave in a way that cannot breach
the SITDRM licenses, thus prohibiting a third-party program from “sniﬃng” the
memory used by the SITDRM software.
• Device Security. All devices attached to the terminal must also be bound to the
SITDRM licenses. This means that if a license allows viewing but not recording,
the device used for viewing must prohibit recording of the data. The devices
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should be provably conforming to the SITDRM licenses; they cannot be modiﬁed
to have diﬀerent capabilities without being approved by the SITDRM software.
• Communication Security. As data is transferred in and out of the terminal
(as well as to output devices on the terminal), it should not be vulnerable to
eavesdropping. Transmissions over “sniﬀable” lines should be encrypted to pre-
vent misuse or copying of decrypted data. For example, data should be encrypted
as it passes through the cable between the video card and the monitor since a
recording device could be inserted between the two components.
5.2 Our Terminal
In this section, we describe the architecture of a tamper-resistant terminal based on
the TCG’s speciﬁcations and the SITDRM platform. We have simpliﬁed some of the
aspects of the full SITDRM Enterprise system in order to facilitate a straightforward
illustration of the techniques employed. We will discuss integration of the simpliﬁed
terminal into the full system in Section 6.2.
5.2.1 Operation
The data user software (which we refer to as the software from here on) is launched
by the operating system. Before execution of the software is allowed, the code is
measured and a PCR is extended with the measurement, logging the launch event
in the TPM’s SML (Figure 3). The software then begins executing by loading the
terminal key into the TPM (since it is probably stored — encrypted by the TPM’s
storage key — somewhere outside the chip) and prompts the user for a password.
The user’s password is used to unlock the user key and also load that into the TPM.
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Fig. 3. When launching, (1) the data user software is measured, (2) the PCR value is extended, (3) the
data user software begins executing, and then (4) the user and terminal keys are loaded into the TPM.
Once launched, the software permits the data user to select items of data that
are available for viewing. When an item is selected and the user requests to perform
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some action (such as view, email, or print), the software attempts to locate a license
allowing it to decrypt the data. If it can ﬁnd one, the encrypted content key is sent
to the TPM for decryption (Figure 4). The decrypted content key is returned and
the cryptographic engine in the data user software decrypts the digital item.
Once the requested action is complete, the content key and decrypted data
are erased from memory. This ensures that the key and unencrypted data are
not present longer than necessary, minimizing the possibility of attack. Memory
shredding techniques [8] can be used to help decrease the chance of a vulnerability.
Fig. 4. The steps taken to decrypt a digital item in the demonstrator: (1) verify the user’s public key, (2)
extract the resource key, (3) decrypt the digital item.
If a license to perform an action is not already installed on the terminal, the
terminal can request one from the licence issuer responsible for the data. Before
issuing any licenses, the license issuer must verify that the terminal is a trusted one
(in addition to satisfying any other conditions it might have for issuing licenses).
This veriﬁcation can be done by adding an Authentication Server (AS). Like
granting tickets in the Kerberos5 system [9], the AS could check that a terminal is
valid, then let the license issuer and data repository know that this user/terminal
combination is allowed to download digital items and licenses.
Authentication to the AS involves proving the integrity of the data user soft-
ware. A secure SITDRM Enterprise system requires that data and licenses are only
issued and distributed to terminals that will abide by the restrictions outlined in
the licenses. Authentication must be established with the following method. Fail-
ure of any of the steps terminates the connection to the server in order to prevent
disclosure of licenses or encrypted digital items to an attacker.
(i) User ID presented to the server
(ii) User and terminal keys presented to the server, encrypted with the server’s
public key
(iii) TC integrity data presented to the server (PCR, SML, and credentials)
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Once the PCR hash has been validated and the SML is accepted by the AS, the
data user client is allowed to request digital items and licenses from their respective
sources. This data should be transferred via a secure channel.
5.2.2 Security Analysis of this Design
In order to satisfy the three goals speciﬁed in Section 3, we must make a few basic
assumptions:
Software-only Adversary. Hardware attacks will not be performed on signals
transmitted between components of the computer. An adversary will most likely
have access to the software in the computer, so a software-driven attack is possible.
Secure Memory. The memory space for the data user software will be secure
and isolated from other processes. This is a safe assumption, since on a trusted
platform, the operating system is part of the chain of trust (Section 4). A trusted
operating system should disallow applications that it runs from accessing each
other’s memory space. It should also provide mechanisms to help prevent data
leaks from unallocated memory or virtual swap space.
Based on the description of a secure terminal presented in Section 3, and the
adaptation described in Section 5.2, a secure TC-based terminal can be constructed.
Goal 1: Prevents Key Exposure — There are three kinds of keys to be con-
sidered: the RSA private key for the user, the RSA private key for the terminal,
and the symmetric keys for content access. The RSA keys are generated by the
TPM and are encrypted by the TPM’s SRK so they can only be used by the
TPM. The software’s memory is isolated from other processes by the operating
system; additionally, the content keys are decrypted as needed, then deleted from
memory. In this way, resource keys are stored decrypted in main memory only
while they are needed. They are never stored decrypted on persistent storage.
Goal 2: Prevents Data Exposure — As described above, the software’s mem-
ory is isolated from other processes by the operating system. Additionally, data
is decrypted as needed for an action, then deleted from memory. Data is never
stored decrypted on persistent storage.
Goal 3: Veriﬁes Terminal Integrity — By following the TC integrity veriﬁca-
tion process, the license issuer is able to test if a terminal is going to follow the
rules speciﬁed by SITDRM licenses. Changes in the SITDRM data user software
are easily detected as an unexpected value in the SML, and untrustworthy system
conﬁgurations can be detected as well.
6 Implementation
We constructed a prototype client using the TPM Software Stack (TSS) [3]. The
purpose of the demonstrator was to exhibit the ability to adapt the current SITDRM
data user client (known as “IPDoc”) to a TC platform as described in Section 5. As
noted earlier, some aspects of the SITDRM system were simpliﬁed in order to make
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the initial prototype easier to understand. Integration of the simpliﬁed prototype
into the full SITDRM Enterprise system is dicussed at the end of this section.
6.1 Design
There were three elements created in development of this demonstrator: a license
and data server, network protocol, and data user client. The only piece of the
system that used a TPM was the client; the other two components were developed
as support software for the client.
6.1.1 License and Data Server
For simplicity, we combined the AS, license issuer, and data repository into one
server that authenticates a client then serves licenses and data. Acting as the
license issuer, a data repository, and a user manager, the server was able to authen-
ticate a client connection (by validating users’ credentials against a list) and then
create/issue licenses and serve encrypted data. As well, the server had the ability
to perform integrity veriﬁcation.
Digital Items (DIs). The server provided a simple interface to whomever runs the
software; it allowed an administrator to import arbitrary data ﬁles which were
then encoded into Base64, then encrypted and encapsulated in an XML format
speciﬁed by MPEG-21’s Digital Item Deﬁnition Language. These items were
encrypted with a unique secret content key, and stored on the server’s hard disk.
Content keys were generated using a one-way function of the server’s secret master
key and the item’s identiﬁer, so it was not necessary to store them individually.
Licenses. The server provided the ability to issue licenses. In this demonstrator,
all users in the system who requested a license were granted a simple license with
the “play” right for all digital items. In a real system, of course, licenses would
only be granted if the requester satisﬁed some policy of the license issuer.
The license was generated and issued using the existing SITDRM software API,
a license authority RSA key pair, and the server’s master key. These licenses
contained a reference to the DI, the DI content key (encrypted with the grantee’s
public key), and the “play” right. Licenses are signed by the license manager
to prevent tampering, and are stored on the server’s hard drive until they are
requested by the grantee of the license.
Authentication. The server also implemented authentication as required to prove
a user’s identity, a terminal’s identity, and a terminal’s integrity. This authenti-
cation is basically user-lookup and key veriﬁcation, then veriﬁcation of SML and
PCR conﬁrmation in the TC style.
6.1.2 Data User Client
The client software provided a simple interface that allowed the user to connect to
a server, download licenses or digital items, then exercise grants provided by any
downloaded licenses. The client implemented a client-side of the network protocol
when communicating with the server. It also made heavy use of the TPM.
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Self-Measurement. Since the OS used for development was not TC-enabled, our
program had to create the measurement events itself. This was done by extending
the PCR with the SHA-1 hash of the executing code.
Key Generation and Storage. The RSA keys for the user and terminal were
generated by the TPM on request. As a simpliﬁcation, the terminal and user key
were combined into one — since the license model was simpliﬁed, there was no
need for two RSA key pairs.
Decryption. Content keys in licenses were sent to the TPM for decryption, since
that is where the user private key was housed. In this way, the user key never
left the TPM unless encrypted by the TPM’s SRK.
Licenses were parsed and enforced using the SITDRM API. Each grant present
in the license were represented by a button that when pressed allowed the user to ex-
ercise it. This was only a single “play” grant for licenses issued by the demonstrator
server. When pressed, the “play” grant exercise button opened a new window and
rendered the document. The window launched a new rendering thread and plugged
into the SITDRM API’s IPMP engine to temporarily decrypt the document.
Though this prototype illustrates the majority of the TPM implementation, se-
cure memory was not established. The development platform contained only an
emulator for the TPM chip, and so the OS was not a trusted operating system.
Additionally, there was no support for isolating process memory spaces on the de-
velopment system, so memory disclosure attack vulnerabilities may still have been
present.
6.2 Integration into SITDRM Enterprise
In the simpliﬁed scenario described above, it is necessary for the license issuer to
know the public key of the terminal on which a digital item is to be used before a
license to use that item can be issued. This is obviously impractical in the scenario
shown in Fig. 1: data subjects have no way of knowing which terminals inside an
organization will be used to process their data.
SITDRM Enterprise solves this problem by using a simple role-based access con-
trol model. In addition to the key pairs possessed by terminals, SITDRM Enterprise
assumes that every role R is associated with a key pair SKR and PKR. We as-
sume that the public keys of all users and roles can be veriﬁed using a public key
infrastructure.
Role-based access control is implemented using a two-stage licensing process:
membership certiﬁcates permit individual data users to act as members of roles
using the PossessProperty right, while resource licenses permit members of roles
to perform actions using the PropertyPossessor principal. In order for a particular
data user to carry out an action on a document, he or she must obtain both a
resource license that permits some role to carry out that action, and a membership
certiﬁcate that makes him or her a member of that role.
A membership certiﬁcate identiﬁes a member of the role by his or her public
key, and contains the private key of the role, encrypted by the public key of the
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terminal on which that membership certiﬁcate is to be used.
Membership certiﬁcates can be obtained from a role issuer operated by the data
controller. The role issuer takes on the role of the authentication server described
earlier, and will only award membership certiﬁcates to terminals that it has estab-
lished can be trusted by TC’s integrity veriﬁcation process. Note that the data
subject must trust the role issuer to manage role memberships in a responsible
fashion.
Resource licenses are issued by data subjects to roles and contain the content
key encrypted by the public key of the role to which the license has been issued. If
a terminal establishes that it has the right to perform an action on the digital item,
it may decrypt the content key from the resource license using the role’s private key
in the membership certiﬁcate.
7 Discussion
Implementing a client that uses the TPM for cryptography, key management, and
integrity reporting is not a simple task. The Trusted Computing Group has pub-
lished an enormous speciﬁcation for each level of their architecture including the
TSS core services — the level used by the demonstrator. As a result, some portions
of the hardened terminal were non-trivial to implement.
Before any functionality of the TPM can be used, its “take ownership” process
must take place. This involves creating some identiﬁers inside the TPM as well
as a Storage Root Key (SRK). Once these are generated, the TPM can be used.
Additionally, the TPM emulator kernel module must be loaded into the kernel and
initialized before the TrouSerS daemon will allow API access to the TPM.
TPM keys are created with a speciﬁed type, either as a signing key, binding key
(for encryption) or as a legacy key (general use). After some testing, it was deter-
mined that the signing and binding keys do not always work when the public key
is exported and used with diﬀerent software. Additionally, when the key is created,
its encoding method must be speciﬁed as either RSA v1.5 or OAEP. Omitting one
of these speciﬁcations when creating a key causes the TPM to assign defaults which
are not speciﬁed by the TCG and can result in unexpected behavior.
The TPM can use either RSA v1.5 or OAEP encoding methods for encrypted
data. OAEP encoding allows a pseudonym to be inserted into padding, which
the TPM uses to insert the string “TCPA”. Unfortunately the Java Cryptography
Extensions do not easily support the pseudonym feature, so it is not possible to use
the TPM with OAEP padding from Java and we had to to use RSA v1.5 encoding
even though OAEP is the encoding method recommended by the XML security
speciﬁcations.
Due to the nature of TC integrity reporting, it is diﬃcult to properly perform
integrity veriﬁcation. First, each item recorded in the SML must be issued a creden-
tial; for example, the OS must have a credential issued by the manufacturer and the
video card must have a signed driver. Second, the credentials must be signed and
veriﬁable using some public key infrastructure — much like SSL certiﬁcates. These
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credentials do not exist (are not created by the manufacturers) and they are not
distributed in a PKI fashion. If a public key infrastructure were implemented prop-
erly to distribute credential signer certiﬁcates, then integrity reporting is strong.
Until then, a third party wishing to verify my terminal is trusted must simply trust
on blind faith all certiﬁcates we provide.
8 Conclusions
We have shown how the TC platform can be used to harden a DRM terminal in
a way that provides for license-abiding use of protected content. Requirements for
this to work properly have been outlined as being: a trusted operating system, a
TPM chip, and an authentication server.
TPM chips are now included in many new commuters, and the most recent
versions of both the Windows and Linux operating systems contain at least some
support for TPMs. TPMs are therefore a very attractive option for securing DRM
terminals.
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